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Should Different People Have Different Governments?

Boffa, Federico; Piolatto, Amedeo; Ponzetto, Giacomo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

The classic theory of fiscal federalism suggests that different people should have different governments. Yet, separate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011274513

Shrouded Costs of Government: Political Economy of State and Local Public Pensions Data

Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the form of pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers' ’and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851457

Are Rules-based Government Programs Shielded from Special-Interest Politics? Evidence from Revenue-Sharing Transfers in Brazil

Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understate the true scope of tactical redistribution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555271

The Social Contract with Endogenous Sentiments

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007

and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es …-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals differ in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution … in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547222

Redistributive Taxation with Endogenous Sentiments

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan Mª; Kranich, Laurence - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual attitudes toward others are endogenously determined …. Attitudes toward others influence the desired extent of redistribution. There are multiple politico-economic equilibria. In one … majority vote for high redistribution. In the other equilibrium, highly skilled workers work above the mean and are admired by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547329

Tobin Meets Oates: Solidarity and the Optimal Fiscal Federal Structure

Calsamiglia, Xavier; Garcia-Milà, Teresa; McGuire, … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972) place in the purview of local governments, exhibit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547424

A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting

Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel Angel; Masatlioglu, … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011253112

Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy

Ponzetto, Giacomo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2011

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At the same time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection. This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters which explains both facts and predicts the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010692002

Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Barberà, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

When the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of the preferred alternatives of voters is (are) indeed the majority (Condorcet) winner(s). This important result of Duncan Black has been crucial in the development of public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773129

Partisan Competition, Growth and the Franchise

Llavador, Humberto; Oxoby, Robert J. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

The nineteenth century was a time of substantial changes in the patterns of economic growth. This was also a period of significant fluctuations in the structure of and allocation of political rights. Through successive franchise extensions, democracy expanded dramatically, giving birth to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851332