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Wage Inequality in a Frictional Labor Market

Shapiro, Joel - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in the past two decades. Standard supply-demand analysis in the empirics of inequality (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992)) indicates that we may attribute some of this trend to an outward shift in the demand for high skilled labor. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547287

A Positive Theory of Geographic Mobility and Social Insurance

Hassler, John; Mora, José Vicente Rodríguez - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals sometimes can affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity arises only for some individuals and the identity of those is unobservable. Unemployment insurance should...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547525

Search and Matching in the Labor Market without Unemployment Insurance

Obiols-Homs, Francesc - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We study the effect of market incompleteness in a search model of the labor market in which the distribution of … idiosyncratic uncertainty is determined endogenously. We show that costly search introduces a wealth effect at low levels of wealth … choose not to search. The effect of the market arrangement remains dramatically large. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011152453

Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319

Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337

Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance

Booth, A. L.; Coles, Melvyn - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities - one where … generates greater investment eficiency, romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency, since more high ability … educational investments and labor force participation based on matching regimes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851358

A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem"

Klijn, Flip; Yazici, Ayse - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401

Median Stable Matching for College Admission

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408

Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation

Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851453