Showing 1 - 5 of 5
This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfllled propose to other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851385
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order L over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851422
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects incentives are drastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189
We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a mechanism to be monotone strategyproof when declaring a "more truthful" preference ordering in the mechanism dominates - with respect to the true preferences - declaring a less truthful...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010692008