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Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547332
A modern economy is an intricately linked web of specialized production units, each relying on the flow of inputs from their suppliers to produce their own output which, in turn, is routed towards other downstream units. In this essay, I argue that this network perspective on production linkages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272282
We provide characterizations of the set of outcomes that can be achieved by agenda manipulation for two prominent sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. Tournaments and super-majority voting with arbitrary quota q are special cases of the general sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961555
We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard level-k models, in this framework the player's `depth of reasoning' is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach, individuals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851323
In contrast to the simplifying assumption of selfishness, social incentives have been shown to play a role in economic interactions. Before incorporating social incentives into models and policies, however, one needs to know their efficiency relative to standard pay-for-performance incentives....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851328
We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851330
We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851346
We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjects choose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and a costly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are most frequent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851352
We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851357
We develop a model in which delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but may benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. By taking the social network connecting agents as given, we study the subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851398