Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 23
Cover Image
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008
. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189
Cover Image
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
Cover Image
Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money
Pérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013
We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337
Cover Image
Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance
Booth, A. L.; Coles, Melvyn - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
generates greater investment eficiency, romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency, since more high ability … decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities - one where … educational investments and labor force participation based on matching regimes. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851358
Cover Image
A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem"
Klijn, Flip; Yazici, Ayse - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401
Cover Image
Median Stable Matching for College Admission
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408
Cover Image
Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation
Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415
Cover Image
The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria
Jaume, Daniel; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851453
Cover Image
Endogenous Matching in University-Industry Collaboration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK
Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013
We develop a two-sided matching model to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We predict a … positive assortative matching in terms of both scientific ability and affinity for type of research, but negative assortative in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019699
Cover Image
Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122