. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms … fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability and efficiency of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our … efficiency of either of the two mechanisms. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston mechanism which has been abandoned in …

In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We …. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when …

We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set … matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal. …

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …

. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the rst best can be achieved using either …

We develop a two-sided matching model to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We predict a … positive assortative matching in terms of both scientific ability and affinity for type of research, but negative assortative in …

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may …