We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These … proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the … externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the …

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and … across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within … issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that …

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to … deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be …

this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade may not be …