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The Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action in a Real-Effort Tournament

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Franke, Jörg; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

Affirmative-action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for. Critics argue that they distort incentives, resulting in lower individual performance, and that the selected pool of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547484

On the Relative Efficiency of Performance Pay and Social Incentives

Gneezy, Uri; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2011

to standard pay-for-performance incentives. We report evidence from a large field experiment comparing the effectiveness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851328

The Role of Role Uncertainty in Modified Dictator Games

Iriberri, Nagore; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjects choose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and a costly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are most frequent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851352

(Bad) Luck or (Lack of) Effort?: Comparing Social Sharing Norms between US and Europe

Rey-Biel, Pedro; Sheremeta, Roman; Uler, Neslihan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2011

We compare the determinants of individual giving between two countries, Spain and the US, which differ in their redistribution policies and their beliefs over the causes of poverty. By varying the information about the determinants of income, we find that, although overall giving is similar in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547117

Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Normal Form Games

Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007

We report experimental results on a series of ten one-shot two-person 3x3 normal form games with unique equilibrium in pure strategies played by non-economists. In contrast to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, a majority of actions taken coincided with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547146

Let's (Not) Talk about Sex: The Effect of Information Provision on Gender Differences in Performance under Competition

Iriberri, Nagore; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2011

rivals gender and/or differences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks that differ regarding …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547208

Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Veszteg, Róbert F. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547209

Travelers' Types

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espinosa, Maréa Paz; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

and the unique equilibrium prediction in a one-shot travelers dilemma experiment (TD). Principal components (PC) analysis …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547217

Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do?

Iriberri, Nagore; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

beliefs about other subjects actions in the same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547252

Endogenous Depth of Reasoning

Alaoui, Larbi; Penta, Antonio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

model delivers testable implications on players' chosen actions as incentives and opponents change. We then test the model …'s predictions with an experiment. We administer different treatments that vary beliefs over payoffs and opponents, as well as … beliefs over opponents' beliefs. The results of this experiment, which are not accounted for by current models of reasoning in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851323