Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive...

We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. Inspired on Hylland and Zeckhauser’s (1979) Pseudomarket mechanism (PM) and on a serial dictatorship, we introduce the Sequential Pseudomarket (SP) where groups of agents...

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Prez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied...

We present a model in which an individual's sentiments toward others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative to the societal average. This, in turn, affects the individual's own behavior and hence other agent's sentiments toward her. We focus on stationary patterns...

We present a model in which each agent's sentiments toward others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they behave relative to a standard of appropriate behavior. As sentiments change, so too does the optimal behavior of each individual, which in turn affects other agents' sentiments...

This paper investigates the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After the sponsor and the contractor sign the contract, the latter may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. Thus, the mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I show how to include...

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p 2 [0; 1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...

Economic predictions are highly sensitive to model and informational specifications. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that, in static games with incomplete information, only very weak predictions, namely, the interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions, are robust to higher-order belief...

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...