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Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation
Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415
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A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences
Ballester, Miguel Ángel; Haeringer, Guillaume - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order L over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851422
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Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
We observe that many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but also (partially) group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation and auctions, in spite of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115552
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Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers
Barberà, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013
Rules of k names are frequently used methods to appoint individuals to office. They are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from an initial set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851425
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A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting
Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel Angel; Masatlioglu, … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012
We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011253112
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Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
Barberà, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010
When the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of the preferred alternatives of voters is (are) indeed the majority (Condorcet) winner(s). This important result of Duncan Black has been crucial in the development of public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773129
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Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Peru
León, Gianmarco - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
I combine a field experiment with a change in voting laws reducing the fine for abstention to assess the effects of monetary incentives to encourage voter participation. Using individual-level experimental variation in the perceived reduction of the fine for abstention and an objective measure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011171808
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Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation
Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
We provide characterizations of the set of outcomes that can be achieved by agenda manipulation for two prominent sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. Tournaments and super-majority voting with arbitrary quota q are special cases of the general sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961555
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On Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form Games
Germano, Fabrizio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003
Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547401
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Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs
Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010
. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two …-solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how theR-solution changes important conclusions of several well known …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496