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The Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action in a Real-Effort Tournament

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Franke, Jörg; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

Affirmative-action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who … individual performance, and that the selected pool of tournament winners may be inefficient. In this paper, we study the … empirical validity of such claims in a real-effort pair-wise tournament between children from two similar schools who …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547484

Aversion to Inequality and Segregating Equilibria

Cabrales, Antonio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547201

The Donor Problem

Abbink, Klaus; Ellman, Matthew - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851320

Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007

the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851463

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Bertrand competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We first present results of experiments in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851468

Collusion in Growing and Shrinking Markets: Empirical Evidence from Experimental Duopolies

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547202

Relative Position, Prices of Sacrifice and Reciprocity: An Experimental Study Using Individual Decisions

Brandts, Jordi; Fatás, Enrique; Lagos, Francisco - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We use experimental data to obtain a detailed description of individuals' pro-sociality. Participants are faced with a large number of decisions involving variations in the tradeoffs between own and others' payoffs, as well as in other potentially important factors like individuals' positions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547280

How Universal is Behavior? A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms

Brandts, Jordi; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Schram, Arthur - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547363

On Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form Games

Germano, Fabrizio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547401

Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547446