Showing 1 - 10 of 12
We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547455
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p 2 [0; 1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188510
Economic predictions are highly sensitive to model and informational specifications. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that, in static games with incomplete information, only very weak predictions, namely, the interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions, are robust to higher-order belief...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196334
-response and reinforcement learning but not under fictitious play. The simulations perform well underflat and upward-slopping supply … bidding, and also for plausible demand elasticity assumptions. Learning is influenced by the number of bids per plant and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851424
Bertrand competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We first present results of experiments in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851468
approach proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2005b) to incorporate model uncertainty and learning into policy decisions. In this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547167
with experience. We then reject increasing confidence in private information or learning about the structure of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547194
&D agreements. We study a Bertrand duopoly where firms evaluate the returns of an agreement according to its length. A learning … from creating an agreement. Moreover, as far as learning is modeled as an iterative process, a suitable set of initial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547320
This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New … these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics … demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132910
Consumption based asset pricing models with time-separable preferences can generate realistic amounts of stock price volatility if one allows for small deviations from rational expectations. We consider rational investors who entertain subjective prior beliefs about price behavior that are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166116