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Aragonès, Enriqueta; Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from diﬀerent sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547237

Rhetoric and Analogies

Aragonès, Enriqueta; Gilboa, Itzhak; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

The art of rhetoric may be defined as changing other people’s minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing them new information. One technique heavily used by rhetoric employs analogies. Using analogies, one may draw the listener’s attention to similarities between cases and to re-organize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851430

On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness

Massé, Jordi; Barreda, Inés Moreno de - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547499

A Model of Participatory Democracy: Undestanding the Case of Porto Alegre

Aragonès, Enriqueta; Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

Participatory Democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both Direct and Representative Democracy: Citizens have the power to decide on policy and politicians assume the role of policy implementation. The aim of this paper is to understand how Participatory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547506

Strategy-proof social choice

Barberà, Salvador - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773120

Voting by Committees under Constraints

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2001

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773124

Heterogeneity, Selection and Labor Market Disparities

Bonfiglioli, Alessandra; Gancia, Gino - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of … the resulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in … ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the best workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261234

Social Capital, Government Expenditures, and Growth

Ponzetto, Giacomo; Troiano, Ugo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We present a tractable stochastic endogenous growth model that explains how social capital influences economic development. In our model, social capital increases citizens' awareness of government activity. Hence, it alleviates the electoral incentives to under- invest in education, whose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851377

Shrouded Costs of Government: Political Economy of State and Local Public Pensions Data

Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the form of pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers' ’and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851457

Should Different People Have Different Governments?

Boffa, Federico; Piolatto, Amedeo; Ponzetto, Giacomo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

The classic theory of fiscal federalism suggests that different people should have different governments. Yet, separate local governments with homogeneous constituents often end up doing poorly. This paper explains why and answers three questions: when regions are heterogeneous, what determines...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011274513