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matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547323
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects incentives are drastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189
. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two …-solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how theR-solution changes important conclusions of several well known …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547148
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is … bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547215
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337
Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851345
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851361