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Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines
Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006
matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547323
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Constrained School Choice
Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129
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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects incentives are drastically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189
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Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs
Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010
. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two …-solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the … selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how theR-solution changes important conclusions of several well known …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496
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Endogenous bargaining power
Esteban, Joan; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547148
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A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict
Esteban, Joan Mª; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is … bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547215
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Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment
Klijn, Flip; Pais, Joana; Vorsatz, Marc - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010
We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the GaleShapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132915
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Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014
We observe that many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but also (partially) group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation and auctions, in spite of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115552
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Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
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Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money
Pérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013
We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337