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Legitimacy, Communication and Leadership in the Turnaround Game

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Weber, Roberto A. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851357

Not Just Like Starting Over: Leadership and Revivification of Cooperation in Groups

Brandts, Jordi; Rott, Christina; Solà, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261233

Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves: An Experimental Study on School Choice

Klijn, Flip; Pais, Joana; Vorsatz, Marc - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

Minority reserves are an affirmative action policy proposed by Hafalir et al. (2013) in the context of school choice. We study in the laboratory the effect of minority reserves on the outcomes of two prominent matching mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms. Our first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950612

Social Capital, Government Expenditures, and Growth

Ponzetto, Giacomo; Troiano, Ugo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We present a tractable stochastic endogenous growth model that explains how social capital influences economic development. In our model, social capital increases citizens' awareness of government activity. Hence, it alleviates the electoral incentives to under- invest in education, whose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851377

Shrouded Costs of Government: Political Economy of State and Local Public Pensions Data

Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers' ’and government employees' votes by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851457

Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems: The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions

Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Barreda, Inés … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851353

The Division Problem under Constraints

Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851412

Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation

Barberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851415

A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences

Ballester, Miguel Ángel; Haeringer, Guillaume - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order L over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851422

Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers

Barberà, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

proposers screen the proposed candidates by voting for v of them and then choose those k with the highest support. We then speak … first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from an initial set of candidates, and then another agent, the … where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. From a normative point of view, we study the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851425

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