Showing 1 - 10 of 12
We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851325
We consider a model of preference in an asymmetric procurement auction with two suppliers. The buyer can award the contract to a preferred supplier at the bid of a competing supplier. As such, the preferred supplier has a right-of-first-refusal. The preferred supplier may be an independent firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851359
In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bankruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851473
We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851480
This paper examines preference in procurement with asymmetric suppliers. The preferred supplier has a right-of-first-refusal to obtain the contract at a price equal to the bid of a competing supplier. Despite the inefficiency created by the right-of-first-refusal, preference increases the joint...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950602
In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyers ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547160
This paper considers the problem of designing selling procedures for substitutes (like condominium units). I show that oral, ascending auctions for the right to choose are efficient. This is a common type of auction used for the sale of real estate. Efficiency is not optimal from the seller's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547200
We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547272
We study the performance of the first-price format in auctions with asymmetric common-values. We show that, contrary to the result for second price auctions, a small advantage for one player translates only to small changes in bidders' strategies, and the equilibrium remains close to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547314
A buyer with downward sloping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in this setting. For the symmetric case, a uniform auction (with price equal to lowest rejected offer) is optimal when complemented with reserve prices for different quantities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547383