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Approximate Knowledge of Rationality and Correlated Equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851330

Ignorance Promotes Competition: an Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations

Ganuza, Juan-José - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object to one of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. The auctioneer does not know bidders' preferences but has private information about the characteristics of the object, and must decide how much information to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547390

Endogenous Private Information Structures

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547453

On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions

Ganuza, Juan José; Penalva, José - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

This paper studies the relationship between the auctioneer's provision of information and the level of competition in private value auctions. We use a general notion of informativeness which allows us to compare the efficient with the (privately) optimal amount of information provided by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547489

Bounded Rationality and Correlated Equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p 2 [0; 1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188510

Uncertain Rationality and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information

Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

Economic predictions are highly sensitive to model and informational specifications. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that, in static games with incomplete information, only very weak predictions, namely, the interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions, are robust to higher-order belief...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196334

Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Llavador, Humberto - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has … consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental outcomes: while … platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547476

The Donor Problem

Abbink, Klaus; Ellman, Matthew - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851320

Bundling in Telecommunications

Garcéa-Mariñoso, Begoña; Martinez-Giralt, Xavier; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

The paper offers an overview of the literature on bundling in the telecommunications sector and its application in the Spanish market. We argue that the use of bundling in the provision of services is associated to technological reasons. Therefore, there appears no need to regulate bundling...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547193

Endogenous Depth of Reasoning

Alaoui, Larbi; Penta, Antonio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard level-k models, in this framework the player's `depth of reasoning' is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach, individuals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851323