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Audit Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil

Zamboni, Yves; Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of procurement processes with evidence of corruption by … about 15 percentage points and the share of audited resources involved in corruption by about 10 percentage points. We show … that these results are invariant to alternative corruption codings that have been used in prior literature. In contrast, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950611

Procurement Design with Corruption

Burguet, Roberto - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

This paper investigates the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After the sponsor …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011095071

Judicial Presence and Rent Extraction

Litschig, Stephan; Zamboni, Yves - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors. Our unique dataset at the level of individual … inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961554

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance

Olivella, Pau; Vera-Hernández, Marcos - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine private health insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider a purely private system or a system in which private insurance supplements a public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately funded health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547456

Inequality and Public Resource Allocation

Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We set up a signaling game where individuals differ in ability and wealth. Higher ability means larger benefit supported by the government. Costly signals are used to transmit information regarding own deservingness. However, capital market imperfections may perturb the signals by limiting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547130

Are Rules-based Government Programs Shielded from Special-Interest Politics? Evidence from Revenue-Sharing Transfers in Brazil

Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usually thought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion in the short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the central and local governments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555271

On the Structure of Cooperative and Competitive Solutions for a Generalized Assignment Game

Arribillaga, Pablo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two alternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019700

On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria

Massé, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. We then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019707

Transparency and Deliberation within the FOMC: a Computational Linguistics Approach

Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael; Prat, Andrea - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect the deliberation of monetary policymakers? We exploit a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 together with computational linguistic models (particularly Latent Dirichlet Allocation) to measure the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010791560

Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337

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