Similar Search Results

Audit Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil

Zamboni, Yves; Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of procurement processes with evidence of corruption by … about 15 percentage points and the share of audited resources involved in corruption by about 10 percentage points. We show … that these results are invariant to alternative corruption codings that have been used in prior literature. In contrast, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950611

Are Rules-based Government Programs Shielded from Special-Interest Politics? Evidence from Revenue-Sharing Transfers in Brazil

Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usually thought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion in the short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the central and local governments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555271

Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions

Ganuza, Juan-José; Celentani, Marco; Peydró, José-Luis - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

International business transactions pose the problem of deterring bribing of public officials by foreign firms. We first analyze a convention styled after the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" that requires signatory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547097

Judicial Presence and Rent Extraction

Litschig, Stephan; Zamboni, Yves - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors. Our unique dataset at the level of individual … inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961554

Inequality and Public Resource Allocation

Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We set up a signaling game where individuals differ in ability and wealth. Higher ability means larger benefit supported by the government. Costly signals are used to transmit information regarding own deservingness. However, capital market imperfections may perturb the signals by limiting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547130

Procurement Design with Corruption

Burguet, Roberto - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

This paper investigates the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After the sponsor …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011095071

Fiat Money in a Search Theoretical Model with Generalist Consumers

Cuadras-Morató, Xavier - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

There are two general ways in which the role of fiat money has been introduced in the standard monetary search-theoretical model. The first is to bring in the model a fiat object with different intrinsic properties. The second is to introduce a centralized institution that favors the use of fiat...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851435

Not Just Like Starting Over: Leadership and Revivification of Cooperation in Groups

Brandts, Jordi; Rott, Christina; Solà, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over - a simple fresh start - leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261233

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547323

General Preferences for Consumption Goods in the Random Matching Model of Commodity Money

Cuadras, Xavier - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

This paper generalizes the original random matching model of money by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) (KW) in two aspects: first, the economy is characterized by an arbitrary distribution of agents who specialize in producing a particular consumption good; and second, these agents have preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547338