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Esteban, Joan; Hauk, Esther - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547239

Audit Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil

Zamboni, Yves; Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of procurement processes with evidence of corruption by … about 15 percentage points and the share of audited resources involved in corruption by about 10 percentage points. We show … that these results are invariant to alternative corruption codings that have been used in prior literature. In contrast, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950611

Are Rules-based Government Programs Shielded from Special-Interest Politics? Evidence from Revenue-Sharing Transfers in Brazil

Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usually thought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion in the short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the central and local governments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555271

Judicial Presence and Rent Extraction

Litschig, Stephan; Zamboni, Yves - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors. Our unique dataset at the level of individual … inspections with irregularities related to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961554

Financing Local Development: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Municipalities in Brazil, 1980-1991

Litschig, Stephan - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2011

by about 4 percentage points. The implied marginal cost of schoolingâ€” accounting for corruption and other leakagesâ …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019696

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation

Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547100

Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

We study situations of allocating positions to students based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for undergraduate student placement, acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547126

Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

Ellman, Matthew; Pezanis-Christou, Paul - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547180

Farsighted House Allocation

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547335

A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects

Hamers, Herbert; Klijn, Flip; Slikker, Marco; Velzen, … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547353