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On Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form Games

Germano, Fabrizio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547401

Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves: An Experimental Study on School Choice

Klijn, Flip; Pais, Joana; Vorsatz, Marc - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

. We study in the laboratory the effect of minority reserves on the outcomes of two prominent matching mechanisms, the Gale …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950612

Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment

Klijn, Flip; Pais, Joana; Vorsatz, Marc - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is inﬂuenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the GaleShapley...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132915

Bargained stable allocations in assignment markets

Núñez, Marina; Rafels, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

For each assignment market, an associated bargaining problem is defined and some bargaining solutions to this problem are analyzed. For a particular choice of the disagreement point, the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851444

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, theR-solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496

Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly … dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this … von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547165

Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets

Tejada, Oriol; Rafels, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

We introduce a subclass of multi-sided assignment games that embodies markets with different types of firms that produce different types of homogeneous goods. These markets generalize bilateral Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We describe the geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547213

On reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games

Llerena, Francesc; Rafels, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We provide a different axiomatization of the core interpreted as a reasonable set (Milnor, 1952) and introduce a new property, called max-intersection, related with the vector lattice structure of cooperative games with transferable utility. In particular, it is shown that the core is the only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547247

A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations

Llerena, Francesc; Rafels, Carles; Vilella, Cori - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

This paper deals with the strong constrained egalitarian solution introduced by Dutta and Ray (1991). We show that this solution yields the weak constrained egalitarian allocations (Dutta and Ray, 1989) associated to a finite family of convex games. This relationship makes it possible to define...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547253

Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547341

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