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The Benefits of Limited Feedback in Organizations

Hansen, Stephen Eliot - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

In most ﬁrms, managers periodically assess workers performance. Evidence suggests that managers with hold information during these reviews, and some observers argue that this necessarily reduces surplus. This paper assesses the validity of this argument when workers have career concerns....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547116

Downsizing, Job Insecurity, and Firm Reputation

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Shapiro, Joel - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

This paper studies how firms make layoff decisions in the presence of adverse shocks. In this uncertain environment, workers' expectations about their job security affect their on-the-job performance. This productivity effect of job insecurity forces firms to strike a balance between laying off...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547509

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance

Olivella, Pau; Vera-Hernández, Marcos - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine private health insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider a purely private system or a system in which private insurance supplements a public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately funded health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547456

Building an Honest Microfinance Organization: Embezzlement and the Optimality of Rigid Repayment Schedules and Joint Liability

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find … that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid … insurance can be provided by borrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851343

Standardized Enforcement: Legal Evolution, Contract Evolution and Standardization

Gennaioli, Nicola; Perotti, Enrico; Ponzetto, Giacomo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

In a model where biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we uncover positive feedback effects between the use … law matures. Contract standardization avoids this cost, statically improving enforcement; but it crowds out innovative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851394

Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design

Brandts, Jordi; Charness, Gary; Ellman, Matthew - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851445

Optimal Coexistence of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts in Labor Markets

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2011

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547187

Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization

Ponzetto, Giacomo - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

I provide a justification of intellectual property rights as a source of static efficiency gains in manufacturing, rather than dynamic benefits from greater innovation. I develop a property-rights model of a supply relationship with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775500

Preferred Suppliers and Vertical Integration in Auction Market

Burguet, Roberto; Perry, Martin K. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

contract to a preferred supplier at the bid of a competing supplier. As such, the preferred supplier has a right …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851359

Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

Finite population non-cooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an ownconcavity effect....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851489