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Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Sotomayor, Marilda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem … implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse … of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851337

Constrained School Choice

Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects incentives are drastically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547189

Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment

Klijn, Flip; Pais, Joana; Vorsatz, Marc - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is inﬂuenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the GaleShapley...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132915

On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

Jaramillo, Paula; Kayi, Çagatay; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010643599

Catchment Areas and Access to Better Schools

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Miralles, Antonio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We compare popular school choice mechanisms in terms of children's access to better schools (ABS) than their catchment area school, in districts with school stratification and where priority is given for residence in the catchment area of the school. In a large market model with two good schools...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011171807

Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching

He, Yinghua; Miralles, Antonio; Yan, Jianye - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851345

The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Güell, Maia - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

The Boston mechanism is a school allocation procedure that is widely used around the world. To resolve overdemands, priority is often given to families who live in the neighborhood school. We note that such priorities define some schools as being safer. We exploit an unexpected change in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011171805

Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Fu, Chao; Güell, Maia - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

An important debate centers on what procedure should be used to allocate students across public schools. We contribute to this debate by developing and estimating a model of school choices by households under one of the most popular procedures known as the Boston mechanism (BM). We recover the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011171806

Comparing Generalized Median Voter Schemes According to their Manipulability

Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851361