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Entry and Market Selection of Firms: A Laboratory Study
Brandts, Jordi; Giritligil, Ayça Ebru - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006
We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments … vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the … amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851346
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Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in "Linear" Cournot Models with Private Information about Costs
Hurkens, Sjaak - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012
Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have private information about their costs is, in general, very cumbersome. Most authors consider therefore linear demands and constant marginal costs. However, within this framework, the nonnegativity constraint on prices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851464
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Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
Bertrand competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We first present results of experiments in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851468
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Collusion in Growing and Shrinking Markets: Empirical Evidence from Experimental Duopolies
Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547202
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Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis
Brandts, Jordi; Abbink, Klaus - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003
We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547452
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The Credit Ratings Game
Bolton, Patrick; Freixas, Xavier; Shapiro, Joel - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010
The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008 has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interest in the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs) in which there are three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547105
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Approximate Knowledge of Rationality and Correlated Equilibria
Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012
We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851330
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Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate
Hamers, Herbert; Klijn, Flip; Slikker, Marco - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013
Scheduling jobs of decentralized decision makers that are in competition will usually lead to cost inefficiencies. This cost inefficiency is studied using the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. First,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851455
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Endogenous Private Information Structures
Hurkens, Sjaak; Vulkan, Nir - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003
We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547453
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Bounded Rationality and Correlated Equilibria
Germano, Fabrizio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p 2 [0; 1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188510