In a model where biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we uncover positive feedback effects between the use of innovative contracts and legal evolution that improve verifiability and contracting over time. We find, however, that the cost of judicial bias also grows over time because...

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

We study situations of allocating positions to students based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for undergraduate student placement, acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient...

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of...

For each assignment market, an associated bargaining problem is defined and some bargaining solutions to this problem are analyzed. For a particular choice of the disagreement point, the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal...

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, theR-solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the...

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...

We introduce a subclass of multi-sided assignment games that embodies markets with different types of firms that produce different types of homogeneous goods. These markets generalize bilateral Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We describe the geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is...

We provide a different axiomatization of the core interpreted as a reasonable set (Milnor, 1952) and introduce a new property, called max-intersection, related with the vector lattice structure of cooperative games with transferable utility. In particular, it is shown that the core is the only...

This paper deals with the strong constrained egalitarian solution introduced by Dutta and Ray (1991). We show that this solution yields the weak constrained egalitarian allocations (Dutta and Ray, 1989) associated to a finite family of convex games. This relationship makes it possible to define...