Similar Search Results

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547440

Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate

Hamers, Herbert; Klijn, Flip; Slikker, Marco - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

Scheduling jobs of decentralized decision makers that are in competition will usually lead to cost inefficiencies. This cost inefficiency is studied using the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. First,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851455

Efficient Bidding with Externalitites

Macho, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851327

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Barberà, Salvador; Gerber, Anke - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as … reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would … be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851378

Bargained stable allocations in assignment markets

Núñez, Marina; Rafels, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

For each assignment market, an associated bargaining problem is defined and some bargaining solutions to this problem are analyzed. For a particular choice of the disagreement point, the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851444

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent … grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R-solution is the most egalitarian …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496

Not Just Like Starting Over: Leadership and Revivification of Cooperation in Groups

Brandts, Jordi; Rott, Christina; Solà, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over - a simple fresh start - leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261233

Proportional Share Analysis

Rafels, Carles; Vilella, Cori - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

find a coalition structure and a payoff vector forming a proportional regular configuration. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547154

Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Walzl, Markus - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547165

Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market

Núñez, Marina; Rafels, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

Existence of von NeumannMorgenstern solutions (stable sets) is proved for any assignment game. For each optimal matching, a stable set is defined as the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with this matching. All these stable sets exclude third-party...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547178