paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers' ’and government employees' votes by …

their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing but convex function of the …

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in … voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is … unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other …

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in … voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is … unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other …

government and a challenger party in opposition compete in elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns … presidential election in 2004. …

is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and … allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns …