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We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268
What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors....
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Study empirically the relationship between liability and insurance in the realm of financial injuries; Evaluate how liability insurance transmits and transforms the deterrence signal of securities liability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005871250
CEE health care and pharma market Importance of the FP7 Public Health call; "Financing Systems' Effect on Healthcare Quality" Scope of InterQuality project. objectives, budget and time-frame Expected impact Consortium Members, Advisory Board ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005871265
This paper assesses the merits of countercyclical bank balance sheet regulation for the stabilization of financial and economic cycles and examines its interaction with monetary policy. The framework used is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banks and bank capital, in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009386558
We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetric information problems on resource allocation. Three problems are examined: moral hazard, adverse selection, and asymmetric learning. One theoretical conclusion, drawn by many authors, is that information problems may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010570021
Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795028