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We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268
Following tournament theory, incentives will be rather low if the contestants of a tournament are heterogeneous. We empirically test this prediction using a large dataset from the German Hockey League. Our results show that indeed the intensity of a game is lower if the teams are more...
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Study empirically the relationship between liability and insurance in the realm of financial injuries; Evaluate how liability insurance transmits and transforms the deterrence signal of securities liability...
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CEE health care and pharma market Importance of the FP7 Public Health call; "Financing Systems' Effect on Healthcare Quality" Scope of InterQuality project. objectives, budget and time-frame Expected impact Consortium Members, Advisory Board ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005871265
Consumer bankruptcy regulation in the United States as well as in many other countries allow consumers to petition for a partial debt discharge. Usually, a debt release is possible when the debtor behaves in the creditors’ best interest and after filing for bankruptcy signs over her entire...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942884
This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the problem of external effects (externalities). Assessing their two most important works, it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for an evaluation of total efficiency, while Pigou, with some exceptions, is convinced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260441
This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005157507