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We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268
providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, either scheme may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696252
What determines equilibrium securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011072798
I consider the efficiency of liability rules when courts obtain imperfect information about precautionary behavior. I ask what tort rules are consistent with socially efficient precautions, what informational requirements the evidence about the parties' behavior must satisfy, what decision rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067689
What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166577
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706739
Given that the chief objective of development policies is to reduce poverty and that work is practically the only source of income for the poor, it is paradoxical that no system has yet been introduced in Africa to monitor the labour market. The labour force survey, the first phase of the 1-2-3...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073171
We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. There may be multiple equilibria within a given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015241
I examine the case where fulfillment of a contractual commitment is only imperfectly verifiable and ask whether the court should then "tell the truth" regarding the action in dispute. I show that truth seeking does not maximize the expected surplus from contractual relationships. From the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795971
We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives for socially efficient behavior, e.g., individuals who cause harm are not always sued or are unable to pay fully for harm done. Some individuals nevertheless behave efficiently because of intrinsic prosocial concerns....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010687448