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Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696268

Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2003

providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, either scheme may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696252

Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude; Helm, Carsten - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2004

We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696275