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Mediated Audits
Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science
recommendation to audit. I characterize the unique threshold value for penalties, that renders auditing profitable. For large … design of separating auditing from contracting. The analysis sheds new light on the usefulness of mediation in contracting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268449
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The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version -
Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science
For optimal audit contracts the principle of maximum deterrence applies: penalties imposed by the contract are either zero or at their maximal level. Additionally, an imperfect audit technology which reveals the agent’s type only with an error makes the principal worse off. In this paper I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268453
Cover Image
Mediated Audits
Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science
recommendation to audit. I characterize the unique threshold value for penalties, that renders auditing profitable. For large … design of separating auditing from contracting. The analysis sheds new light on the usefulness of mediation in contracting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199119