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Mediated Audits
Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science
each reported type the mediator randomizes over a base-contract and the audit contract, which is accompanied by a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199119
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Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation
Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science
lock-in effect prevents relocation in both periods. Paradoxically, the distortion in the first-period contract can be so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189118
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Mediated Audits
Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science
each reported type the mediator randomizes over a base-contract and the audit contract, which is accompanied by a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268449
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The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version -
Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science
For optimal audit contracts the principle of maximum deterrence applies: penalties imposed by the contract are either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268453