Similar Search Results

Bank Funding Structures and Risk; Evidence From the Global Financial Crisis

Federico, Pablo; Vázquez, Francisco F. - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2012

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650626

Bank Ownership, Market Structure and Risk

Nicoló, Gianni De; Loukoianova, Elena - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007

relationship between banks' risk of failure, market structure, bank ownership, and banks' screening and bankruptcy costs. These … model rationalizes this evidence if both state-owned and foreign banks have either larger screening and/or lower bankruptcy … costs than private domestic banks, banks' differences in market shares, screening or bankruptcy costs are not too large, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826093

The Use (and Abuse) of CDS Spreads During Distress

Spackman, Carolyne; Singh, Manmohan - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009

Credit Default Swap spreads have been used as a leading indicator of distress. Default probabilities can be extracted from CDS spreads, but during distress it is important to take account of the stochastic nature of recovery value. The recent episodes of Landbanski, WAMU and Lehman illustrate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826491

The Costs of Sovereign Default

Borensztein, Eduardo; Panizza, Ugo - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2008

This paper evaluates empirically four types of cost that may result from an international sovereign default: reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities. It finds that the economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005769045

The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions; The Case of theeuropean Union

Cihák, Martin; Nier, Erlend - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009

The global financial crisis has demonstrated weaknesses in resolution regimes for financial institutions around the globe, including in the European Union (EU). This paper considers the principles underlying resolution regimes for financial institutions, and draws out how a well-designed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528635

Counterparty Risk, Impacton Collateral Flows and Role for Central Counterparties

Aitken, James; Singh, Manmohan - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009

Counterparty risk in the United States stemming from exposures to OTC derivatives payables (after netting) is now concentrated in five banks?Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and Citi. This note analyzes how such risks have shifted over the past year. We estimate that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528640

Money for Nothing and Checks for Free; Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets

Mills, Paul S.; Kiff, John - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007

. Notwithstanding the bankruptcy of numerous mortgage companies, historically high delinquencies and foreclosures, and a significant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005605115

Principles of Household Debt Restructuring

Laryea, Thomas; Laeven, Luc - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790464

Macroprudential Regulation Under Repo Funding

Valderrama, Laura - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2010

may lead to the bankruptcy of its repo counterparties triggering contagion across asset classes. To buttress the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671292

Making OTC Derivatives Safe; A Fresh Look

Singh, Manmohan - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2011

Recent regulatory efforts, especially in the U.S. and Europe, are aimed at reducing moral hazard so that the next financial crisis is not bailed out by tax payers. This paper looks at the possibility that central counterparties (CCPs) may be too-big-to-fail entities in the making. The present...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876583