This paper analyzes the trade-off between official liquidity provision and debtor moral hazard ininternational financial crises. In the model, crises are caused by the interaction of bad fundamentals,self-fulfilling runs and policies by three classes of optimizing agents: international...

[...]Our first suggestion is to reduce the fragmentation oftrading in STRIPS by assigning the same CUSIP number to allSTRIPS maturing on a common date—thus making thoseSTRIPS fungible with each other. In addition to enhancing theliquidity of the STRIPS market, this action would ensure...

Traditionally, regulation of banks has focused on the riskentailed in bank loans. Loans are typically nontradedassets. In recent years, another component of bank assetshas become increasingly important: assets actively tradedin the financial markets.1 These assets form the “tradingbook” of a...