self-enforcement (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate … which international technological spillovers are also quantified. The results of our analysis partly support Barrett’s and … Benedick’s conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on …

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the … international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons … treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterizing an …

Parties has important implications for both the effectiveness and the efficiency of future climate policies. Among these … implications, those related with technical change and with the functioning of the international market for carbon emissions are … countries in the short and in the long run. This Paper analyses the consequences of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto …

free-riding incentives is a policy mix in which global emission trading is coupled with a transfer mechanism designed to … the incentives for more countries – particularly big emitters – to accept an emission reduction scheme defined within an … international climate agreement. This Paper shows that this conjecture is only partly supported by the empirical evidence that can …

policies. This policy approach is explicitly bottom-up, namely it gives each country the freedom to sign agreements and deals …No international regime on climate change is going to be fully effective in controlling GHG emissions without the … paper aims at exploring whether a different policy approach could lead more countries to adopt effective climate control …

and in actual policymaking, is to link negotiations on climate change control with decisions concerning international R … reduced emission abatement in the US, but also the spillover effects on technology and countries’ relative bargaining power …&D cooperation. This Paper explores this idea by analysing on the one hand the incentives for EU, Japan and Russia to adopt this …

cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China … designing the emission-trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore …, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different …