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How does leadership support the activity of communities of practice ?

Muller, Paul - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 2006

the purpose of this paper is to present leadership as an important mechanism underlying the coordination and the … cohesion of communities of practice. More precisely, it will be shown that an important factor conditioning the coordination … influence is grounded on the high degrees of reputation and trust they enjoy within the community. However, coordination of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385236

Coordination failures in network formation.

Carayol, Nicolas; Roux, Pascale; Yıldızoglu, Murat - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 2006

approach allows us to observe and discuss the coordination failures that arise in a strategic network formation context with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570137

Intellectual property in a knowledge-based economy : Patents to include vs. patents to exclude.

Cohendet, Patrick; Farcot, Matthieu; Pénin, Julien - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 2009

the main role of the patent system is therefore to ensure the coordination among heterogeneous actors and to structure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965185

Who are the Voluntary Leaders? Experimental Evidence from a Sequential Contribution Game.

Préget, Raphaële; Nguyen-Van, Phu; Willinger, Marc - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 2012

We show that the preference to act as a leader rather than as a follower is related to subjects’ behavioral type. We rely on the methodology proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) in order to identify subjects’ behavioral types. We then link the likelihood...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004027

Voluntary Contributions and Framing effect: Theory and Evidence

VERGNAUD, Jean-Christophe; WILLINGER, Marc; … - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 1999

Overcontribution in experiments on voluntary contribution to a public good has not yet received a fully satisfactory explanation. In those experiments, subjects cooperate, in contradiction with the game-theoretic prediction. In contrast, in oligopoly-experiments and common pool resource...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385259

Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods.

Dehez, Pierre - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 2010

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008508371

Non-Cooperative Behavior in a Public Goods Experiment with Interior Solution

WILLINGER, Marc; ZIEGELMEYER, Anthony - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 1999

We designed an experiment on voluntary contribution to a public good with interior solution. The treatment variable is the equilibrium level of contribution. We observe that the verage overcontribution rate (cooperation) is affected by the equilibrium level of contribution. Overcontribution is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230746

Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution.

WILLINGER, Marc; ZIEGELMEYER, Anthony - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 1999

We show that experimental subjects tend to contribute more to the public good if they perceive the actions of the others as a source of positive externality rather than a source of negative externality. In our experiment partial contribution to the public good is the unique subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230758

Optimal production of transplant care services.

Deffains, Bruno; Ythier, Jean Mercier - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), … - 2009

Most organ transplants are from dead donors. National transplant organizations exhibit considerable differences in terms of their donor population rates. Spain’s organization is by far the most efficient in this respect. We argue that much of the productivity advantage of Spain’s transplant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991347