Within a New Keynesian model subject to misspecification, we examine the quadratic contracts in a delegation framework where government and private agents are uncertain about central bank preferences for model robustness. We show that, in the case of complete transparency, the optimal penalty is...

This paper discusses the problem of monetary policy transparency in a simple static robust control framework. In this framework, we identify two sources of monetary policy uncertainty. First, we identify the uncertainty about the central bank’s inflation stabilization preferences, which...

This paper examines the relationship between the preference for ro- bustness of central bank (when it fears that its model is misspecified), the inflation persistence and the output cost of disinflation. Using a simple monetary game model in which higher preference for robustness of central bank...

Using a macroeconomic model with asset prices, we analyze how optimal monetary policy, and macroeconomic dynamics and performance are affected by the central bank’s desire to be robust against model misspecifications. Considering the worst-case model, we show that an increase in the central...

Using a New Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine the accountability issue in a framework of delegation where government and private agents are uncertain about the central bank’s preference for model robustness. We show that, in the benchmark case of full transparency, the...