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Amegashie, J. Atsu; Runkel, Marco - CESifo - 2008

We consider a differential game of a conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge. We show …-Palestinian conflict. We also discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics and their strategic value as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094263

Socially-Tolerable Discrimination

Amegashie, J. Atsu - CESifo - 2008

such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple rent-seeking model of conflict which is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094272

Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma

Amegashie, J. Atsu - CESifo - 2009

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034639

Politics and IMF Conditionality

Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - CESifo - 2013

Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877803

Geopolitics, Aid and Growth

Dreher, Axel; Eichenauer, Vera; Gehring, Kai - CESifo - 2013

We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Donor countries’ political motives might reduce the effectiveness of conditionality, channel aid to inferior projects or affect the way aid is spent in other ways, reduce the aid bureaucracy’s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010671571

The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-driven Aid less Effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - CESifo - 2010

As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572559

Geopolitics, Aid and Growth

Dreher, Axel; Eichenauer, Vera; Gehring, Kai - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Donor countries’ political motives might reduce the effectiveness of conditionality, channel aid to inferior projects, reduce the aid bureaucracy’s effort, and change the power structure in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083419

Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme

Öhler, Hannes; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Dreher, Axel - CESifo - 2011

Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009020789

An Empirical Inquiry into the Nature of Welfarism

Amegashie, J. Atsu; Ouattara, Bazoumana - CESifo - 2011

Economists typically evaluate policies based on how such policies affect individuals’ utilities. We follow this approach by taking a welfarist view of the USA’s espoused policy of promoting liberty in other parts of the world. However, we take a nuanced view by investigating the type of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833936

Aid and Growth at the Regional Level

Dreher, Axel; Lohmann, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper brings the aid effectiveness debate to the sub-national level. We hypothesize the non-robust results regarding the effects of aid on development in the previous literature to arise due to the effects of aid being insufficiently large to measurably affect aggregate outcomes. Using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266530