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Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy

Mermelstein, Ben; Nocke, Volker; Satterthwaite, Mark; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study optimal merger policy in a dynamic model in which the presence of scale economies implies that firms can reduce costs through either internal investment in building capital or through mergers. The model, which we solve computationally, allows firms to invest or propose mergers according...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084004

Dynamic Merger Review

Nocke, Volker; Whinston, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656370

Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product … collusion than a similar merger with a smaller buyer. This formalizes the idea expressed in the U.S. and EU non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468660

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

In this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms’ ability to sustain collusion. We show in … a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Several effects arise. When … upstream offers are secret, vertical mergers facilitate collusion through the operation of an outlets effect: Cheating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126686

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2003

We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms' ability to sustain tacit collusion in a repeated game …. We identify several effects and show that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Most … importantly, vertical mergers facilitate collusion through the operation of an outlets effect: cheating unintegrated firms can no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061911

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In this Paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms’ ability to sustain collusion. We show in … a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Several effects arise. When … upstream offers are secret, vertical mergers facilitate collusion through the operation of an outlets effect: cheating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791331

The Role of Quality in Service Markets Organized as Multi-Attribute Auctions

Krasnokutskaya, Elena; Song, Kyungchul; Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

-attribute auctions in which buyers take into account seller's price as well as various characteristics, including quality. Our …-attribute auctions as is common in public procurement. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822892