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Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Svensson, Roger - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865973

The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and Oligopolists

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Exit of venture-backed firms often takes place through sales to large incumbent firms. We show that in such an environment, venture-backed firms have a stronger incentive to develop basic innovations into commercialized innovations than incumbent firms, due to strategic product market effects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791605

Project Heterogeneity and Growth: The Impact of Selection

Ates, Sina T.; Saffie, Felipe E. - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

In the classical literature of innovation-based endogenous growth, the main engine of long run economic growth is firm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822888

How and Why Does Knowledge Spill Over? The Case of Biotechnology

Audretsch, David B; Stephan, Paula E - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper sheds light on the questions, Why does knowledge spill over? and How does knowledge spill over? The answer to these questions lies in the incentives confronting scientists to appropriate the expected value of their knowledge considered in the context of their path-dependent career...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666782

Venture Capital, Patenting, and Usefulness of Innovations

Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We analyze incentives to develop entrepreneurial ideas for venture capitalists (VCs) and incumbent firms. If VCs are sufficiently better at judging an idea's value and if it is sufficiently more costly to patent low than high value ideas, VCs acquire valuable ideas, develop them beyond the level...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643508

Which Immigrants Are Most Innovative and Entrepreneurial: Distinctions by Entry Visa

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Using the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates, I examine how immigrants perform relative to natives in activities likely to increase U.S. productivity, according to the type of visa on which they first entered the United States. Immigrants who first entered on a student/trainee visa or a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468510

Entrepreneurial Innovations, Entrepreneurship Policy and Globalization

Douhan, Robin; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

What explains the world-wide trend of pro-entrepreneurial policies? We study entrepreneurial policy in a lobbying model taking into account the conflict of interest between entrepreneurs and incumbents. It is shown that international market integration leads to more pro-entrepreneurial policies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530366

Optimal Public Policy for Venture Capital Backed Innovation

Keuschnigg, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

regard to the capital gains tax, innovation subsidy, public R&D spending and other policy initiatives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497714

Management of Knowledge Workers

Hvide, Hans K; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497759

And the Winner Is--Acquired: Entrepreneurship as a Contest with Acquisition as the Prize

Henkel, Joachim; Rønde, Thomas; Wagner, Marcus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage … innovation. In the second stage, successful entrants bid to be acquired by the incumbent. We assume that entrants cannot survive …&D approaches than the incumbent and are more likely to generate the highest value innovation. Thus, the need of entrants to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784763