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The Impact of Liquidity Regulation on Bank Intermediation

Bonner, Clemens; Eijffinger, Sylvester C W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We analyze the impact of non-compliance with a requirement similar to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and its … non-compliance with a liquidity requirement causes banks to pay and charge higher interest rates as well as to increase … be affected by the requirement. While non-compliance with a liquidity requirement does not seem to directly affect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084639

The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The Paper analyses the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection. We show that entrepreneurs and workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high employment protection. This ‘corporatist’ agreement is feasible if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666907

Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions

Rossi, Stefano; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper studies the determinants of mergers and acquisitions around the world during the 1990s by focusing on differences in laws and regulation across countries. We find that the volume of M&A activity and the premium paid are significantly larger in countries with better investor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788892

Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789093

The Corporate Governance of Defined-Benefit Pension Plans: Evidence from the United Kingdom

Cocco, Joâo Francisco P.D.; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper studies the governance of defined-benefit pension plans in the United Kingdom. We construct a governance measure, equal to the proportion of trustees of the pension plan who are also executive directors of the sponsoring company. Our findings indicate that pension plans of indebted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792367

The Political Economy of Finance

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The regulations that shape the design and the operations of corporations, credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124338

Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy

Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups. The results suggest that there is poor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136454

Corporate Governance Externalities

Acharya, Viral V; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136630

Competition for Managers, Corporate Governance and Incentive Compensation

Acharya, Viral V; Gabarro, Marc; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We propose a model in which better governance incentivizes managers to perform better and thus saves on the cost of providing pay for performance. However, when managerial talent is scarce, firms' competition to attract better managers reduces an individual firm's incentives to invest in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083347

Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and insolvency resolution

Eijffinger, Sylvester C W; Nijskens, Rob - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

During the recent financial crisis, central banks have provided liquidity and governments have set up rescue programmes … bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity and monitors too little. A … central bank can alleviate the liquidity problem, but induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce an additional authority …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320403