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Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Globalization and Cooperative Relations

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

reciprocal exchange to lifetime employment, from relational governance to corruption/collusion. We study how agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136656

Pension Fund Governance and the Choice Between Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans

Besley, Timothy J.; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension …. Under complete contracting, governance can be shown to be neutral: DC and DB plans differ only on risk allocation. If …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497828

Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device, or: "Everybody Happy but the Consumer"

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1998

The paper proposes a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders - such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423775

Ownership, Control, and Collusion

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1996

The paper addresses the effects of the separation of ownership and control on long-run competition in oligopolies. It finds that when managers have the preference for smooth time-paths of profits revealed by the evidence on "income smoothing," manager-led firms can sustain any collusive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649468

Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B

Iossa, Elisabetta; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Contracts often reward inefficient tasks and are not enforced ex post. We provide a new explanation based on the relationship between explicit contracts and implicit agreements, distinguishing the ex-ante decision to sign a contract from the ex-post decision whether to apply it. We show that it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854495

Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks

Frisell, Lars; Roszbach, Kasper F.; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Recent research on central bank governance has focused mainly on their monetary policy task. As the sub-prime loan … also in ensuring their soundness and stability. In this paper we study the specific corporate governance structures of a … public governance literatures, where present. Our analysis highlights a striking variety in central bank governance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656403