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The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India
Besley, Timothy J.; Burgess, Robin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791661
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Machiavellian Underpricing
Biais, Bruno; Perotti, Enrico C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
We analyse politically motivated privatization design in a bipartisan environment where politicians lack commitment power. Suppose the median class voters a priori favour redistributive policies. If the privatization programme succeeds in allocating enough shares to these citizens, they become...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661730
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The Dynamics of Political Support for Reform in Economies in Transition
Rodrik, Dani - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995
This paper considers a simple model of economic transition to analyse the dynamics of preferences over economic policy … the early stages of the transition, the private sector expands at a rate that is lower than the rate at which the state … subsidy to the state sector, which has the effect of slowing down the transition. The analysis focuses on the dynamic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123914
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Voting with your Children: A Positive Analysis of Child Labour Laws
Doepke, Matthias; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child-labour regulation, based on two key mechanisms. First, parental decisions on family size interact with their preferences for child-labour regulation. Second, the supply of child labour affects skilled and unskilled wages. If policies are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067344
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The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation
Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
The privatization process in Eastern Europe is not irreversible. Future governments may want to expropriate successful private firms by increasing taxation or by renationalizing them in order to subsidize unsuccessful firms. The paper uses a simple median voter model to predict the policy of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667078
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On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatization and Restructuring
Roland, Gérard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994
This paper examines aspects of speed and sequencing of restructuring and privatization in economies in transition. It …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791380
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The Role of Political Constraints in Transition Strategies
Roland, Gérard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994
economic transition. The big bang approach emphasizes the importance of windows of opportunity when ex ante political … reforms so as to build, at each stage of transition, constituencies for further reform. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791538
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The Political Economy of Transition in the Soviet Union
Roland, Gérard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992
This paper analyses the political economy of transition in the Soviet Union since Perestroika. It is argued that no … necessitating an increase in the speed of economic transition, in a situation where the political conditions for further reform had … transition and stabilization delays the adoption of necessary economic measures. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656344
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The Design of Reform Packages Under Uncertainty
Dewatripont, Mathias; Roland, Gérard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993
We present a model of large-scale economic reforms, modelled on the transition process in Eastern Europe, with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661961
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A Democratic Model of the `Rent-Sought' Benefit Cycle
Beenstock, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1989
Lobby groups press for various administrative concessions which are granted at the expense of the rest of society. This paper tries to explain why sometimes the rest of society does not prevent the lobbies from exploiting them while at other times it protests against the injustice. It also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656374