This paper examines three questions concerning the international coordination of macroeconomic policy. First it examines whether it is advantageous for governments to cooperate in the determination of monetary and fiscal policies. Second it asks whether it is helpful for governments to establish...

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the open economy aspects of the 'delegation game' in which the operation of monetary policy is delegated to independent and `conservative' central bankers with a greater dislike of inflation than the public. When all countries optimally and...

This Paper evaluates alternative designs of indicator regimes for monetary policy in a small stochastic macromodel of the small open economy with rational expectations. The paper first derives methods for deriving optimal control rules and optimal simple feedback rules in rational expectations...

This paper provides a resolution of the non-uniqueness of reputational equilibria in the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game. We introduce a `chisel-proof' credibility condition which ensures that in response to a small deviation from the low inflation rate by the central bank, it never pays for...