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Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game

Dai, Zhixin; Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2014

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899359

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

Garbled Elections

Schmitz, Patrick W; Tröger, Thomas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Majority rules are frequently used to decide whether or not a public good should be provided, but will typically fail to achieve an efficient provision. We provide a worst-case analysis of the majority rule with an optimally chosen majority threshold, assuming that voters have independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497826

Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Farming on Cooperation in Experiments.

Andreoni, J. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443443

The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China

Persson, Petra; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Performance-based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who rose from low to high positions within...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165652

Centralized decision making against informed lobbying

Costa Lima, Rafael; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We re-address the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policymakers are subject to capture by special interest groups. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to exert influence. We find a new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083471

Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. In an incomplete contracting framework, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We show that this conclusion relies on their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083497

How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods?

Karlan, Dean S.; List, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

-scale natural field experiments. In the first experiment, a charity focusing on poverty reduction solicited donations from prior … the second field experiment, the same charity sent direct mail solicitations to individuals who had not previously donated … than not identifying the name of the matching donor. The first experiment demonstrates that the matching grant condition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084090

Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084108

Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084279