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Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue

Osterloh, Margit; Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts. These scandals cause an enormous amount of damage, not only to the companies affected, but also to the market economy as a whole. As a solution, conventional wisdom suggests more monitoring and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760916

On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

yielding equilibria exhibiting various degrees of inefficiencies and fraud. The variety of results has fostered the impression …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791194

Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper studies the consequences of price discrimination in a market for experts’ services. In the case of experts markets, where the expert observes the intervention that a consumer needs to fix his problem and also provides a treatment, price discrimination proceeds along the dimension of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504480

Withering academia?

Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010

, increased division of labor in research, intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of “university …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672224

Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies

Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

democracies. The incumbent can prevent credible challengers from running, organize vote fraud, or even physically eliminate the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084133

(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static andDynamic Bargaining Experiments

Fischer, Sven; González Morales, Luis G.; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602

Measuring the Degree of Ambiguity about Probability: Experimental Evidence

Morone, Andrea; Özdemir, Özlem - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

This paper aims to experimentally investigate how individual willingness to pay for a lottery is affected by using a new way of representing of probabilistic ambiguity. Thus we can see how individual valuation reacts to different degrees of ambiguity probability information provided to subjects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866670

Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies

Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

. We report the results of a series ofexperiments. The first experiment is designed as a straightforward theory … symmetric networks. Collusion cannot account for the observed behavior. In our second experiment we reject the conjecture that … two-stage game. Finally, in our third experiment we reduce the complexity of the setting by transforming the original two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866674

The Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions in the Laboratory:A Stress Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism

Boun My, Kene; Cochard, François; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

We investigate the ability of the damage based tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a controlled laboratory environment which incorporates important aspects of nonpoint pollution problems. Our experimental setting combines a strictly convex damage function with uncertainty in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866677

Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Gameswith Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs

Fischer, Sven - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680

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