We propose a formal concept of the power of voice in the context of a simple model where individuals form groups and trade in competitive markets. Individuals use outside options in two different ways. Actual outside options reflect the possibility to exit or to join other existing groups....

We use a North-South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto-dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is...

We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management. A competitive investor can invest through an index fund or an active fund run by a manager with unknown ability. Following a negative cashflow shock to assets held by the active fund, the investor...

The thesis presents a construction of a grid that discretizes the threshold model introduced by Geman and Roncoroni (2006) for electricity spot prices, incorporating both mean reversion and jumps, the direction of the latter depending on the price of the underlying at the time of the jump. The...

The article analyzes the Dynkin (1975) stochastic model of economic equilibrium. We solve a question regarding this model that was open for a long time. We provide arguments yielding a complete proof of Dynkin's existence theorem for equilibrium paths.

This paper provides evidence for the assertion that there is deep structural coherence between the work of Adam Smith and modern general equilibrium theory, most notably Gérard Debreu's Theory of Value. In particular, we show that Adam Smith formulated a number of highly original and to some...

We develop a theory of decision making and General Equilibrium for contingent markets when incomplete preferences are generated by second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). Demand, Pareto-optima and equilibria dominance are fully characterized. Demands and equilibrium allocations are...

We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

The objective of this paper is to adopt a general equilibrium model and determine the socially efficient discount factor and discount rate when there are heterogeneous anticipations about the future of the economy as well as heterogeneous time preference rates. Among others we tackle the...