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Legal Standards, Enforcement and Corruption

Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the "tollbooth view" of regulation, the standard chosen by a self …-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a …-capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistently with the model's predictions for benevolent governments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504469

Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing

Bennardo, Alberto; Pagano, Marco; Piccolo, Salvatore - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

When a customer can borrow from several competing banks, multiple lending raises default risk. If creditor rights are poorly protected, this contractual externality can generate novel equilibria with strategic default and rationing, in addition to equilibria with excessive lending or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792414

Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?

Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco; Polo, Michele - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We analyze optimal policy design when firms' research activity may lead to socially harmful innovations. Public intervention, affecting the expected profitability of innovation, may both thwart the incentives to undertake research (average deterrence) and guide the use to which innovation is put...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000438

The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The Paper analyses the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection. We show that entrepreneurs and workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high employment protection. This ‘corporatist’ agreement is feasible if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666907

Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789093

Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model

Lombardo, Davide; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We analyze how the law and its enforcement affect equity market equilibrium. Improvements in the legal system, while invariably associated with broader equity markets, have different effects on equity returns depending on the institutional change considered and on the degree of international...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792541

Legal Determinants of the Return on Equity

Lombardo, Davide; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Recent work documents that better legal institutions are associated with broader equity markets. We investigate whether international differences in legal institutions also help explain the international cross-section of expected stock returns. We document three main regularities. First, total...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123538

The Political Economy of Finance

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The regulations that shape the design and the operations of corporations, credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124338

Managers, Workers and Corporate Control

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a 'poison pill' through generous long-term labour contracts and thereby reduce the firm’s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497936

Liquidity-Constrained Households in an Italian Cross-Section

Jappelli, Tullio; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1988

find that in Italy borrowing constraints are more severe than in the United States, and that they are more stringent for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281355