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Brollo, Fernanda; Nannicini, Tommaso; Perotti, Roberto; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of … implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed … transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468543

Social Capital and Political Accountability

Nannicini, Tommaso; Stella, Andrea; Tabellini, Guido; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

In this paper, we empirically investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share norms of generalized morality demand higher standards of behavior on their elected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530376

How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792107

Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136516

Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the appointed policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498040

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Bordignon, Massimo; Nannicini, Tommaso; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145395

The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian---as opposed to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662287

Electoral Rules and Corruption

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido; Trebbi, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social … determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems influence … corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498017