We examine global dynamics under learning in New Keynesian models with price level targeting that is subject to the zero lower bound. The role of forward guidance is analyzed under transparency about the policy rule. Properties of transparent and non-transparent regimes are compared to each...

Most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts. However, in practice contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here. We consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk, aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. We show that, with...

Using indirect inference based on a VAR we confront US data from 1972 to 2007 with a standard New Keynesian model in which an optimal timeless policy is substituted for a Taylor rule. We find the model explains the data both for the Great Acceleration and the Great Moderation. The implication is...

Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the...

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence for the Spanish economy, over the period 1977-97, on whether monetary policy shocks have had different effects on real output growth depending on the state of the business cycle. To do so, we adopt an extension of Hamilton's (1989) Markov Switching...

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the open economy aspects of the 'delegation game' in which the operation of monetary policy is delegated to independent and `conservative' central bankers with a greater dislike of inflation than the public. When all countries optimally and...

This Paper proposes a new framework to analyse systematic and unsystematic monetary policy within the same econometric model. As in Bernanke and Boivin, 2001, the model aims at capturing the following facts: monetary authorities use information from a large number of data series to extract a...

Nowadays a considerable amount of information on the behaviour of the economy is readily available, in the form of large datasets of macroeconomic variables. Central bankers can be expected to base their decisions on this very large information set. Yet the academic profession has shown a clear...

In this paper we investigate central bank accountability by looking at the effect of transparency in a simple monetary policy game with an overriding mechanism. Monetary policy is transparent if there is little uncertainty about the central banker's preferences for inflation stabilization...

Central banks have become increasingly transparent during the last decade. One of the main benefits of transparency predicted by theoretical models is that it enhances the credibility, reputation, and flexibility of monetary policy, which suggests that increased transparency should result in...